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Abstract—Information Dispersal Algorithms (IDAs) have been
widely applied to reliable and secure storage and transmission
of data files in distributed systems. An IDA is a method that
encodes a file F of size L = |F | into n unrecognizable pieces
F1, F2, · · · , Fn, each of size L/m (m < n), so that the original
file F can be reconstructed from any m pieces. The core of an
IDA is the adopted non-systematic m-of-n erasure code. This
paper makes a systematic study on the confidentiality of an IDA
and its connection with the adopted erasure code. Two levels
of confidentiality are defined: weak confidentiality (in the case
where some parts of the original file F can be reconstructed
explicitly from fewer than m pieces) and strong confidentiality (in
the case where nothing of the original file F can be reconstructed
explicitly from fewer than m pieces). For an IDA that adopts an
arbitrary non-systematic erasure code, its confidentiality may fall
into weak confidentiality. To achieve strong confidentiality, this
paper explores a sufficient and feasible condition on the adopted
erasure code. Then, this paper shows that Rabin’s IDA has
strong confidentiality. At the same time, this paper presents an
effective way to construct an IDA with strong confidentiality from
an arbitrary m-of-(m+ n) erasure code. Then, as an example,
this paper constructs an IDA with strong confidentiality from
a Reed-Solomon code, the computation complexity of which is
comparable to or sometimes even lower than that of Rabin’s
IDA.
Index Terms—Cauchy matrix, confidentiality, erasure code,
information dispersal algorithm, Reed-Solomon code, Vander-
monde matrix.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, Rabin [1] proposed an attractive Information Dis-
persal Algorithm (IDA) that is applicable to reliable and secure
storage and transmission of data files in distributed systems.
Since then, IDAs have drawn many attentions from both
researchers and engineers in the area of distributed systems.
An IDA is a method that encodes a file F of size L = |F |
into n unrecognizable pieces F1, F2, · · · , Fn, each of size
L/m (m < n), so that the original file F can be reconstructed
from any m pieces. From a coding theorist’s viewpoint, an
IDA is corresponding to a non-systematic m-of-n erasure code
[2]. Here, the non-systematic property of the erasure code is
necessary to ensure “unrecognizable” pieces. In practice, an
IDA is implemented as follows: The original file F is firstly
divided into m segments S1, S2, · · · , Sm, each of size L/m.
Then, the m segments are encoded into n unrecognizable
pieces F1, F2, · · · , Fn using a non-systematic m-of-n erasure
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code.
The reliability of an IDA is clear: no more than n − m
lost pieces of the n pieces F1, F2, · · · , Fn will not result
in data loss. However, the confidentiality of an IDA is not
straightforward and deserves a systematic study.
From the view of information-theoretic security [3], IDAs
can provide only incremental confidentiality and thus have
weaker confidentiality than secret sharing (with perfect con-
fidentiality) [4]–[6] and ramp schemes (with partially per-
fect confidentiality) [7], [8]. However, IDAs can achieve
optimal efficiency in data overhead [1]. As shown in [9,
Page 65, Table A], there is a trade-off between confidential-
ity and data overhead. Moreover, for practical applications,
information-theoretic security is often extravagant and unnec-
essary. Thus, in this paper, we will study the practical security
that IDAs can provide.
Although a non-systematic erasure code can ensure “un-
recognizable” pieces in an IDA, some segments may still be
reconstructed explicitly from fewer than m pieces. Then, an
eavesdropper who acquires fewer than m pieces by snooping
may reconstruct some parts of the original file F explicitly,
resulting in partial file leakage. In the case of partial file
leakage, we say the IDA has weak confidentiality. However,
for an ideal IDA, any segment of the original file F should not
be reconstructed explicitly from fewer than m pieces. In the
case where nothing of the original file F can be reconstructed
explicitly from fewer than m pieces, we say the IDA has strong
confidentiality.
For an IDA that adopts an arbitrary non-systematic erasure
code, we noticed that its confidentiality may fall into weak
confidentiality. In this paper, we will first show in Section III
which kind of IDAs has weak confidentiality and how an
eavesdropper can reconstruct some segments of the original
file F explicitly from fewer than m pieces in the case of
weak confidentiality. Then, to achieve strong confidentiality,
we explore a sufficient and feasible condition for an IDA
in Section IV. We show that Rabin’s IDA [1] has strong
confidentiality. At the same time, we present an effective
way to construct an IDA with strong confidentiality from an
arbitrary m-of-(m+ n) erasure code. Then, as an example,
we construct an IDA with strong confidentiality from a Reed-
Solomon code [10], the computation complexity of which is
comparable to or sometimes even lower than that of Rabin’s
IDA. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section V. To our
knowledge, this paper is the first work that focuses on the
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2issues of weak confidentiality and strong confidentiality in
IDAs.
To make our later discussion more easily understood, we
begin this paper with a brief introduction of IDAs and their
erasure codes.
II. IDAS AND THEIR ERASURE CODES
In an Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA), a
non-systematic m-of-n erasure code is employed to encode
the m segments S1, S2, · · · , Sm into n unrecognizable pieces
F1, F2, · · · , Fn, i.e.
(S1, S2, · · · , Sm) ·Gm×n = (F1, F2, · · · , Fn), (1)
where Gm×n is the generator matrix of the adopted erasure
code and meets the following two conditions:
1) Any column of Gm×n is not equal to any column of an
m×m identity matrix; and
2) Any m columns of Gm×n form an m×m nonsingular
matrix.
The first condition ensures that any piece is unrecognizable;
while the second condition ensures that the original file F can
be reconstructed from any m pieces.
III. WHICH KIND OF IDAS HAS WEAK CONFIDENTIALITY
In this section, we will show which kind of Information
Dispersal Algorithms (IDAs) have weak confidentiality and
how an eavesdropper can reconstruct some segments of the
original file F explicitly from fewer than m pieces in the case
of weak confidentiality. We present a theorem as follows:
Theorem 3.1: An IDA has weak confidentiality if and only
if the adopted erasure code meets the following condition: In
its generator matrix Gm×n, there is a submatrix Am′×n′ of
column rank r, where m′, n′ < m and n′ − r = m−m′ > 0.
Proof: We first prove the sufficiency. Suppose Am′×n′
is located in rows i1, i2, · · · , im′ and columns j1, j2, · · · , jn′
of Gm×n. Then, Si1 , Si2 , · · · , Sim′ are the m′ segments
corresponding to rows i1, i2, · · · , im′ of Gm×n. Similarly,
Fj1 , Fj2 , · · · , Fjn′ are the n′ pieces corresponding to columns
j1, j2, · · · , jn′ of Gm×n. Since n′ − r = m − m′ > 0,
r = m′ + n′ − m. Furthermore, since m′, n′ < m, then
r < m′, n′. Thus, Am′×n′ is rank deficient. Then, in Am′×n′ ,
any k = n′ − r columns can be linearly represented by
other r columns. Let Am′×n′ = (v1, v2, · · · , vn′), where
v1, v2, · · · , vn′ are column vectors. Suppose there is a linear
relation among column vectors of Am′×n′ as follows:
(v1, v2, · · · , vk) = (vk+1, vk+2, · · · , vn′) ·Br×k,
where Br×k is the transpose of coefficient matrix. Then,
any information of Si1 , Si2 , · · · , Sim′ can be eliminated by
calculating
(F˜j1 , F˜j2 , · · · , F˜jk) = (Fj1 , Fj2 , · · · , Fjk)
− (Fjk+1 , Fjk+2 , · · · , Fjn′ ) ·Br×k. (2)
Finally, according to Equation (1), other m−m′ = k segments
except Si1 , Si2 , · · · , Sim′ can be reconstructed explicitly.
We now prove the necessity. If some segments can be
reconstructed explicitly from fewer than m pieces in an IDA,
it is clear that the information of other segments should be
able to be eliminated from the eavesdropped pieces by linear
operations. Moreover, a solvable system of linear equations on
these reconstructible segments should be able to be formed.
From the above proof of sufficiency, we can deduce that in
the corresponding generator matrix Gm×n, there should be a
submatrix Am′×n′ of column rank r, where m′, n′ < m and
n′ − r = m−m′ > 0.
Remark: From the second condition in the previous section,
we can deduce a necessary condition n′ − r ≤ m − m′
(otherwise the corresponding n′ columns of Gm×n will form
a rank deficient matrix—a contradiction). Thus, for an IDA
that adopts an arbitrary non-systematic erasure code, its con-
fidentiality may fall into weak confidentiality.
IV. CONSTRUCTING IDAS WITH STRONG
CONFIDENTIALITY
For an Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA), to achieve
strong confidentiality, we explore a sufficient and feasible
condition as follows:
Theorem 4.1: An IDA has strong confidentiality if the
adopted erasure code meets the following condition: Any
square submatrix of its generator matrix Gm×n is nonsingular.
Proof: We prove this theorem by contradiction as fol-
lows: In this case, suppose this IDA has weak confidentiality.
According to Theorem 3.1, in Gm×n, there is a subma-
trix Am′×n′ of column rank r, where m′, n′ < m and
n′ − r = m − m′ > 0. Then, according to the proof of
Theorem 3.1, Am′×n′ is rank deficient. Thus, in Am′×n′ , any
min(m′, n′) × min(m′, n′) square submatrix is singular—a
contradiction! Therefore, this IDA has strong confidentiality.
In Rabin’s IDA [1], the corresponding generator matrix is a
Cauchy matrix, in which any square submatrix is nonsingular.
Thus, Rabin’s IDA has strong confidentiality.
Inspired by the work in [11], we now present an effective
way to construct an IDA with strong confidentiality from an
arbitrary m-of-(m+ n) erasure code as follows:
1) Choose an arbitrary m-of-(m+ n) erasure code, whose
generator matrix is Gm×(m+n) = (Cm×m|Dm×n);
2) Construct an IDA that adopts an m-of-n erasure code
whose generator matrix is C−1m×m ·Dm×n.
It is easy to verify that the IDA constructed above has strong
confidentiality as follows:
1) In the case where Cm×m is an m×m identity matrix,
the chosen m-of-(m+ n) erasure code is a system-
atic erasure code. Then, according to the nature of a
systematic m-of-(m+ n) erasure code [2], any square
submatrix of Dm×n = C−1m×m · Dm×n is nonsingular.
Thus, according to Theorem 4.1, the constructed IDA
has strong confidentiality.
2) In the case where Cm×m is not an m × m
identity matrix, the chosen m-of-(m+ n) erasure
code is a non-systematic erasure code. Then,(
Im×m|C−1m×m ·Dm×n
)
is the generator matrix of
the equivalent systematic m-of-(m+ n) erasure
3code. So, any square submatrix of C−1m×m · Dm×n
is nonsingular. Thus, according to Theorem 4.1, the
constructed IDA also has strong confidentiality.
Example: We construct an IDA with strong confidentiality
from a Reed-Solomon code [10], whose generator matrix is a
Vandermonde matrix. From what we have discussed above,
we first choose a m-of-(m+ n) Reed-Solomon code with
generator matrix
GRS =

a01 a
0
2 · · · a0m+n
a11 a
1
2 · · · a1m+n
...
...
. . .
...
am−11 a
m−1
2 · · · am−1m+n
 , (3)
where a1, a2, · · · , am+n are distinct. Then, an IDA with strong
confidentiality can be reconstructed, in which the correspond-
ing generator matrix is
GIDA =

a01 a
0
2 · · · a0m
a11 a
1
2 · · · a1m
...
...
. . .
...
am−11 a
m−1
2 · · · am−1m

−1
×

a0m+1 a
0
m+2 · · · a0m+n
a1m+1 a
1
m+2 · · · a1m+n
...
...
. . .
...
am−1m+1 a
m−1
m+2 · · · am−1m+n
 . (4)
From the comparison results in [12], we can deduce that
the computation complexity of this IDA is comparable to or
sometimes even lower than that of Rabin’s IDA.
Remark: Besides Cauchy matrices, Vandermonde matrices
were also suggested for the generator matrices of IDAs in
Rabin’s seminal paper [1, Page 339]. However, a Vandermonde
matrix defined over a finite field may contain singular square
submatrices [2, Page 323, Problem. (7)]. Then, an IDA whose
erasure code is a Reed-Solomon code defined over a finite field
may not meet the condition in Theorem 4.1 and thus may have
weak confidentiality. Luckily, in the literature, when Rabin’s
IDA is mentioned, it always refers to that constructed based
on a Cauchy matrix.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Information Dispersal Algorithms (IDAs) [1] have been
widely applied to reliable and secure storage and transmis-
sion of data files in distributed systems. This paper made
a systematic study on the confidentiality of IDAs and its
connection with the adopted erasure codes [2]. Specially,
this paper studied the confidentiality of IDAs from the view
of practical security. This paper defined and discussed two
levels of confidentiality: weak confidentiality (in the case
where some parts of the original file can be reconstructed
explicitly from fewer than the threshold number of pieces)
and strong confidentiality (in the case where nothing of the
original file can be reconstructed explicitly from fewer than the
threshold number of pieces). This paper showed which kind
of IDAs have weak confidentiality and how an eavesdropper
can reconstruct some segments of the original file explicitly
from fewer than the threshold number of pieces in the case
of weak confidentiality (see Theorem 3.1). It was noticed that
for an IDA that adopts an arbitrary non-systematic erasure
code, its confidentiality may fall into weak confidentiality. To
achieve strong confidentiality, this paper explored a sufficient
and feasible condition for an IDA (see Theorem 4.1). It was
showed that Rabin’s IDA [1] has strong confidentiality. At the
same time, this paper presented an effective way to construct
an IDA with strong confidentiality. Then, as an example, this
paper constructed an IDA with strong confidentiality from
a Reed-Solomon code [10], the computation complexity of
which is comparable to or sometimes even lower than that of
Rabin’s IDA.
The key message we want to deliver through this paper is
that an arbitrary non-systematic erasure code is not enough
for strong confidentiality in an IDA. When referring to the
confidentiality of an IDA in a practical application, we should
keep this point in mind!
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